Comments

The Evolution of the
Capital Punishment Jurisprudence
of the United States Supreme Court
and the Impact of
Tuilaepa v. California
on that Evolution*
By choosing to make capital punishment a sentencing option,
state legislatures assume the responsibility of creating a capital
punishment sentencing scheme. This ensures that the death penalty
is imposed in a manner that comports with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In 1972, due to the protection afforded by the Eighth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court began to analyze how
much discretion was granted to the sentencing bodies responsible
for determining whether a capital offender is sentenced to death or
life imprisonment. This began an evolution in this country s capital
punishment jurisprudence which has continued through the present
term of the Supreme Court. The focus of each stage of this
evolution has been the aggravating factor and the manner in which
it guides the discretion of the capital punishment sentencing bodies,
thus ensuring that the death penalty is imposed in a constitutional

* Special thanks to Justice Richard Ruffin.an for his thought provoking
suggestions, as well as his valuable insight and guidance. Thank you also to Katherine
Hunsaker for her constant support and understanding.
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manner. This Comment argues that in its 1994 decision ofTuilaepa
v. California, the Supreme Court began a new era in capital
punishment jurisprudence. There now exists a two-step process for
sentencing a capital offender to death. In addition, requirements
placed upon an aggravating factor depend upon the step in which
the factor is being considered.
INTRODUCTION

The capital punishment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court is based upon the principles and ideas embodied in the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 Long ago, however, the
Court announced that the protection provided by the Cruel.and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment is not susceptible to
precise de:finition.2 Therefore, the Court has struggled to develop a
definitive standard that establishes what must be included in a constitutional capital punishment sentencing scheme. As a result, what is
constitutionally required of a capital punishment statute has undergone
a dramatic evolution over the past twenty-five years. 3
This evolution began during the 1970's when the Supreme Court
announced that the death penalty is a very unique form of punishment,

1. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII (emphasis added).
By using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth
Amendment was construed to restrict the states' authority to inflict punishment in
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); see also Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). In pertinent part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); see
also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (stating that "[d]ifficulty would
attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which
provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted").
3. This Comment will only discuss the death penalty as a punishment for the
crime of murder. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the death penalty is
a "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is
therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). In the Coker decision, the Supreme Court implied
that no state may invoke the death penalty as a punishment for a crime in which no life
is taken. See Michael W. Combs, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment:
Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Judicial Control, 7 S.U. L. REV. at 1, 33 (1980). However,
some states still have statutes which designate crimes other than murder as capital
offenses, such as aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, treason, skyjacking, and some
drug offenses. See Raymond J. Pascucci, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the
Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1222-24 (1984). The
federal government also has a statute which designates a crime other than murder as a
capital offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (punishing espionage as a capital offense).

594

[VOL. 32: 593, 1995]

Capital Punishment Jurisprudence
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

in both its severity and irrevocability.4 As such, it requires a correspondingly unique method of determining whether it is the appropriate
punishment in each case in which it is imposed. 5 Before this evolution
began, the death penalty was assumed to be a constitutionally permissible form of punishment. The only constitutional challenges to the death
penalty were to the means by which the offender was put to death. 6
However, as a result of its announcement, the Court began to closely
scrutinize the capital punishment statutes which were employed by the
states. In particular, the Court examined the amount of guidance and
discretion the states provided to their sentencing authority when directing
the authority to determine which offenders would be sentenced to death
and which to life imprisonment. This examination began the dramatic
evolution of the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence and left the
states unclear as to what was required of a constitutional death penalty
statute.
By 1978, the decisions of the Supreme Court had begun to develop a
framework that provided the states with some greatly needed direction.
The guiding principle of these decisions was that a capital punishment
sentencing scheme must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."7 Through several convolute<l; decisions, 8 the
Supreme Court suggested that a state must adhere to this guiding
principle by directing its sentencing authority to consider, in each case,
the circumstances that justified executing the offender 9 and those that

4. Furman, 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 306 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
5. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (explaining that "death
is· qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long ... [and]
[b]ecause of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case").
6. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 282-84 (Brennan, J., concurring).
7.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313); see also Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
8. Furman v. Georgia (1972) was a 5-4 decision with the Justices writing nine
separate opinions totaling 233 pages. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238-470. The "1976 cases"
(Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, Jurek v. Texas, Woodson v. North Carolina and
Roberts v. Louisiana) were all sharply divided decisions which totaled 211 pages.
9.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98.
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might mitigate against such a sentence. 10 This was in contrast to the
previous practices of permitting the sentencing authority to arbitrarily
sentence the offender to death11 or mandating it to do so if the offender
is found guilty of any enumerated offense. 12 With this rough framework in place, state legislatures began to modify their death penalty
statutes in an effort to comply with the Supreme Court's ambiguous
mandates. 13 Gradually, many of these state statutes were brought
before the Supreme Court. The Court has slowly provided more and
more guidance as the evolution of the constitutional death penalty statute
has continued.
Presently, thirty-eight states have death penalty statutes. 14 Although
the details of each state's statute differ, they all generally employ some
form of guided discretion. A guided discretion statute is one in which
the sentencing authority's 15 discretion to impose the death penalty is
10. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
11. For a discussion of this practice, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
12. For a discussion of this practice, see Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 301-05 (1976).
13. For example, California's death penalty statute was either ruled unconstitutional or changed dramatically six times during the 1970's alone. See John W. Poulos,
Capital Punishment, the Legal Process, and the Emergence of the Lucas Court in
California, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 157, 169-97 (1990).
First, in February of 1972, in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100
Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), the California Supreme Court held that the death penalty was
invalid per se under the California Constitution. Poulos, supra, at 169-70. Second, in
November of 1972, Proposition 17 was passed as part of the general ballot and the
California Constitution was amended to make the death penalty constitutionally valid.
Id. at 171. Third, in 1973, the California Legislature enacted a mandatory death penalty
statute following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman. Id. at 172-73.
Fourth, in 1976, in Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 650 (1976), the California Supreme Court held that California's mandatory death
penalty was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Poulos,
supra, at 176-77. Fifth, in 1977, the California Legislature enacted another death penalty
statute in an attempt to comply with the decisions of the California and U.S. Supreme
Courts. Id. at 177-83. Finally, in 1978, Proposition 7 was passed during the general
election, making dramatic changes to the 1977 death penalty statute and making
California's death penalty law much "stronger." Id. at 183-95.
14. See Patricia Mitchell, Executions In America, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at
A5 (chart). The article cited actually indicates that there are only 37 states with the
death penalty, however, in March of 1995, New York added a death penalty statute to
its books which went into effect on September 1, 1995. 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1, §§ 20,
38 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 60.06).
15. A majority of states provide for jury sentencing in capital cases, however,
some allow the judge to be the sentencing authority or to override the recommendation
of an advisory jury. Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14
(1980); see, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-703(B) (1989 & Supp. 1994) (making the
court alone the sentencing authority); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1985)
(granting the judge final authority to impose or withhold the death sentence notwithstanding the jury's recommendation); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 (1984)
(stating that 30 of the 37 death penalty jurisdictions make the jury the ultimate
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guided by its consideration of the factors in the case that aggravate in
favor of the death penalty16 and those that mitigate against it. 17 Under
a guided discretion statute, aggravating factors perform a constitutionally
essential function in that the sentencing authority is required to find at
least one aggravating factor present in a case before the death penalty is
even an option. Due to the central role that aggravating factors play in
a constitutional death penalty statute, it is critical that the aggravating
factors utilized are defined in a constitutionally permissible fashion and
perform the necessary function.
In the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Tuilaepa v.
California, 18 the Court for the first time suggested that the amount of
precision with which an aggravating factor must be defined, as well as
the exact function an aggravating factor must perform, depends upon the
stage of the capital sentencing process in which the factor is utilized. 19
This Comment will trace the evolution of the requirements which the
Constitution places upon the process utilized to sentence an offender to
death and analyze the impact of the Court's decision in Tuilaepa upon

sentencing authority with three of the remaining seven allowing a judge to override a
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment). In_Spaziano, the Supreme Court ruled that
jury sentencing is not constitutionally required. Id. at 464.
16. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1976). These factors are tenned
"aggravating factors," or aggravating circumstances, and are those facts about the capital
offender's particular record or the offense which warrant the offender being sentenced
to death instead of life imprisonment. They include such things as a previous murder
conviction, the murder being committed to prevent a lawful arrest, or the murder being
committed for pecuniary gain. Typically, the factors are referred to as statutory
aggravating factors, or circumstances, because they are enumerated in a state's death
penalty statute. See infra note 63 for a discussion of whether it is a constitutional
requirement that only statutory aggravating factors, as opposed to non-statutory
aggravating factors, are utilized to sentence a capital offender to death.
17. These factors are tenned "mitigating factors," or mitigating circumstances, and
are "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978). Elements typically used as mitigating factors include
age, lack of prior criminal activity, and extreme mental deficiency.
18.
114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994).
·
19. Id. at 2634. In Tuilaepa, the Court, for the first time, stated that the process
of sentencing a capital offender to death is comprised of two steps. During the first step,
or the eligibility stage, the group of all offenders convicted of murder is narrowed down
to a smaller group of all offenders who are deemed to be eligible for the death penalty
based upon the.facts of their particular case. During the second step, or the selection
stage, the individuals that will receive the death penalty are selected from the group of
capital offenders that were deemed to be eligible for that punishment. Id. at 2634-35;
see also supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
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that evolution. Section I will provide important background information
regarding the standards used by the Court to decide which punishments
comport with the Eighth Amendment's mandates. Section II will trace
the evolution of the death penalty statute in the decisions of the Supreme
Court. The emergence of guided discretion statutes as the preferred
means of satisfying the requirements of the Eighth Amendment will then
be discussed. Section III will focus specifically on the role of aggravating factors in a guided discretion statute, as well as the requirement that
an aggravating factor not be unconstitutionally vague. Section IV will
discuss and analyze the Tuilaepa decision. Section V will discuss the
effect that the Tuilaepa decision has had on the evolution of the
constitutional requirements placed upon a capital punishment statute.
Finally, Section VI will provide a brief conclusion on the evolutionary
nature of the requirements of a constitutional death penalty statute.
I.

MEANING OF "NOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS"20

Most of the early decisions of the Supreme Court which contemplated
the protection provided by the Eighth Amendment simply assumed that
if a punishment was similar to one that was deemed to be cruel and
unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted, then it was itself
cruel and unusual. 21 Therefore, in 1890, the Court adopted the circular
standard that if a punishment was "manifestly cruel and unusual" it fell
within the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment. 22 Twenty years
later, in Weems v. · United States, 23 the Supreme Court renounced this
antiquated standard when it recognized that "a principle to be vital must
be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth."24 Thus, in Weems the Court recognized that the standard which
should be used to decide if a punishment is indeed cruel and unusual
must be a fluid standard that has the ability to change with the times.
In Trop v. Dulles, 25 the Court again renounced the "manifestly cruel
and unusual" standard and recognized the evolutionary nature of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. It acknowledged that the Clause
20.
For a more thorough examination of the meaning of the phrase "nor cruel and
unusual punishment" see Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). See also Alan I. Bigel,
William H. Rehnquist on Capital Punishment, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 729, 734-36
(1991); Therese M. Roy, Note, Solem v. Helm: The Court's Continued Struggle to
Define Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 590, 592-602 (1985).
21.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972).
Id. at 264-65 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890)).
22.
23.
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Id. at 373.
24.
25.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."26 Accordingly, the Court
announced that "[t]he basic concept underlying the [Clause] is nothing
less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish,
the [Clause] stands to assure that this power be exercised within the
limits of civilized standards."27 The Court thereby interpreted the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting
the infliction of any punishment that is beneath human dignity. 28 The
standard to be used to determine which punishments are beneath human
dignity is that established by contemporary societal values. 29
While a standard based on contemporary societal values may seem to
be as vague and imprecise as the Clause itself, the Court's application
of this standard has provided meaningful guidance and made this
standard a viable one. Chief Justice Burger noted that "in a democracy
the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic standards of
decency prevailing in the society. " 30 The Court has expanded on this
proposition and now determines contemporary societal values by
examining "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a
given sanction."31 First among these indicia are the decisions of state
legislatures. "[L]egislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining"
contemporary societal values. 32 Second, the sentencing decisions of
juries are examined. The jury "is a significant and reliable objective
index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved" in the
process of sentencing an offender to death. 33 Through this two-part
examination, the Court ensures that a particular punishment comports
with contemporary societal values and thus with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
26. Id. at 100-01. See also Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (stating that the Clause "may
be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice").
27. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
28. Id.; see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 378; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
666 (1962).
29. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
30. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf
id. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he acceptability of a severe
punishment is measured, not by its availability, for it might become so offensive to
society as never to be inflicted, but by its use").
31. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
32. Id. at 175.
33. Id. at 181.
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
STATUTE

A.

The Fall of Unfettered Sentencing Discretion

Prior to 1972, there was no need to apply the guarantee of the
contemporary societal values standard to the death penalty because death
was simply assumed to be a constitutionally permissible form of
punishment. That assumption·was not at that point challenged. 34 As
a result, the state legislatures were given carte blanche to adopt any
death penalty statute which they saw fit. Taking advantage of this
unlimited authority, the legislatures granted their sentencing authorities
unrestrained and unguided discretion in determining which capital
offenders received the death penalty and which received life imprisonment. 35
However, in 1972, this practice of giving the sentencing authority
unfettered discretion was challenged in the landmark case of Furman v.
Georgia. 36 In Furman, the Supreme Court heard the appeal of three
defendants who had been sentenced to death, two of whom were
sentenced under the Georgia capital punishment sentencing scheme and
one under the Texas scheme.37 The Court granted certiorari to
determine whether ''the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
34. Furman, 408 U.S. at 285 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 241 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[i]t has been assumed in our decisions that punishment by
death is not cruel, unless the manner of execution can be said to be inhuman and
barbarous" (construing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
35.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.1 (West 1970).
At the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, all of the states had
mandatory death penalty statutes; if the offender was convicted of an enumerated
offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. However, juries began to react
unfavorably to the mandatory nature of these statutes and often refused to convict an
offender of the enumerated offenses. In an effort to eliminate this problem, the
legislatures made several modifications to their death penalty statutes (including splitting
the offense of murder into first and second degree murder), but none of these efforts
were successful. Consequently, in Tennessee in 1838, the mandatory death penalty
statute was abandoned in favor of a discretionary death penalty statute which permitted
the jury (or sentencing authority) to choose between the death penalty and life imprisonment, based upon whichever criterion it chose. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 289-95 (1976) (relating the history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the
United States).
36.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
37. Id. at 239. One of the Georgia defendants was sentenced to death based upon
his conviction for the crime of first-degree murder. The other Georgia defendant and
the Texas defendant were sentenced to death based upon their convictions for the crime
ofrape. Id.
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the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"38 Not surprisingly, the case
resulted in a sharply divided five to four decision by the Court with nine
separate opinions being written. 39 Two of the concurring Justices
adopted the view that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional and
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in all cases. 40
However, the other three concurring Justices were unwilling to hold that
the death penalty was per se unconstitutional. 41 Instead, these three
Justices ruled strictly on the constitutionality of the defendants' death
sentences, holding that the procedures used to impose these particular
sentences were constitutionally deficient. 42 The view espoused by these
three concurrences is generally considered to be the holding of
Furman. 43
Although no one rationale can be cited as the basis for the Court's
decision in Furman, 44 there is at least one principle which is common

38. Id. (alteration in original).
39. Id. at 238-470.
40. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justices Brennan and Marshall continued to advocate that the death penalty was per se
unconstitutional throughout the remainder of their terms on the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 904-05 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Barclay
v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 974-91 (1983) (Marshall, J. dissenting); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 320-45 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356, 366 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 30924 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 755-56 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
41. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart,
J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam).
43.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 600 (1978).
44.
Justice Douglas held that the death penalty was applied in a discriminatory
fashion and thus violated the defendants' right of equal protection, which he believed to
be "implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Furman, 408 U.S. at 257
(Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan held that the death penalty was "inflicted arbitrarily" and that because
it violated the four factors that he had developed in order to determine whether a given
punishment was cruel and unusual it was unconstitutional per se. Id. at 305 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
Justice Stewart held that the death penalty was applied in a "capricious" and "random"
manner and therefore violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice White held that the death penalty statutes before the Court were unconstitutional because they were applied so infrequently that they actually undermined the social
purposes (incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution) that justified their enactment. Id.
at 311-13 (White, J., concurring).
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to all five concurring opinions. That principle is that the broad and
unguided discretion which the states gave to their sentencing authorities
prior to Furman allowed the death penalty to be imposed in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. 45 The concurring opinions all held that "the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to
be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."46 Thus, what Furman was
construed to prohibit was the unguided and unrestrained exercise of
discretion in choosing which capital offenders received the death penalty
and which received life imprisonment.
.
The holding of Furman was expressly confined to the Georgia and
Texas death penalty statutes which were at issue in the consolidated
cases before the Supreme Court.47 In reality though, Furman implicitly
rendered all death penalty statutes then in existence unconstitutional
because each of those statutes provided the particular sentencing
authority the same broad and unguided discretion that the Georgia and
Texas statutes provided to their sentencing authorities. 48 The Court's
Furman decision, however, failed to provide the states with any
meaningful guidance with regard to the procedures that might make a
capital punishment statute constitutional. The significance and the
impact of the Furman decision therefore blindly cast the United States
into a new era of capital punishment jurisprudence.
B.

The State Legislatures' Responses to Furman

In response to the vague pronouncements of Furman, many state
legislatures sought to rewrite death penalty statutes which had been

Justice Marshall held that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional because it "is
morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history."
Id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring).
45. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (explaining that "Furman held that [the death
penalty] could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk
that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner'').
46. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart compared
the chances of being sentenced to death to that of being struck by lightning. "These
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual." Id. at 309.
47. See id. at 239-40 (per curiam).
48. Id. at 417 (Powell, J. dissenting). At the time of the Furman decision, 40
states and the District of Columbia had death penalty statutes and 39 of these statutes
were rendered µnconstitutional by the Court's decision. The only statute surviving the
Furman decision was that of Rhode Island (which provided for the death penalty for the
offense of murder by a life term prisoner) because it was a mandatory statute and the
Furman decision did not speak to mandatory statutes. Furthermore, the Furman decision
"remove[d] the death sentences previously imposed on some 600 persons awaiting
punishment in state and federal prisons throughout the country." Id.
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effectively, although not expressly, ruled unconstitutional by the decision
in that case.49 However, it was unclear whether Furman s prohibition
of unguided and unchanneled sentencing discretion required the
elimination of all sentencing discretion or just that the discretion be
guided. Consequently, the state legislatures were left to sift through
Furman 's nine separate opinions in their efforts to create a constitutionally valid capital punishment sentencing scheme.
As a result of this ambiguity, two very different schools of thought
emerged, each with its own distinct interpretation of Furman. 50 The
majority view interpreted Furman as holding that the Constitution did
not permit a capital sentencing authority to have any discretion at all.
This school of thought asserted that the statute which was most likely to
withstand a constitutional attack was one that imposed a mandatory
death .sentence if the offender was convicted of an enumerated offense.
Twenty-two states adopted this view and removed all discretion from the
capital punishment sentencing process by adopting mandatory death
penalty statutes. 51
The minority view focused on the type and amount of discretion that
was afforded the sentencing authorities in the pre-Furman death penalty
statutes. This school of thought asserted that the unguided nature of the
discretion produced the constitutional flaw rather than the simple fact
that the sentencing authority was granted the discretion to make its own
decision. Consequently, this minority believed that as long as the
sentencing authorities' discretion was suitably guided, a death penalty
statute would withstand a constitutional attack. Twelve states adopted
this view and enacted statutes which were modeled after the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code Section 210.6.52 Section 210.6 set

49.
Between June 29, 1972, the date on which Furman was decided, and July 2,
1976, the date the next significant capital punishment decision was announced by the
Supreme Court, 44 states redrafted their death penalty statutes in an effort to comply
with the mandates of Furman. See Poulos, supra note 13, at 172.
50. See Poulos, supra note 13, at 172. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
180 (1976).
See Poulos, supra note 13, at I 72. For examples of these mandatory death
51.
penalty statutes see 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1201, § I; 1973 La. Acts no. 109, § I; Act
of Sept. 24, 1973, ch. 719, 1973 Cal. Stat. 1297.
See Poulos, supra note 13, at 172.
52.
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forth a guided discretion statute which utilized aggravating and
mitigating circumstances to guide the sentencing authority's discretion. 53
C.

The "1976 Cases" and the Emergence of Guided Discretion

By 1976, several of the statutes which had been enacted in response
to Furman had been the subject of constitutional attacks, and thus, had
begun to work their way through the nation's court system. By July 2,
1976, five of these statutes had made their way to the Supreme Court.54
On that date, the Court announced five death penalty decisions which
have become known collectively as the "'76 Cases". 55 These five cases
provided the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to clarify its
enigmatic Furman decision and to identify constitutionally acceptable
capital punishment sentencing procedures.
The first of the '"76 Cases" was Gregg v. Georgia. 56 In Gregg, the
Court examined the Georgia state legislature's use of a guided discretion
statute57 in an effort to comply with the dictates of Furman. However,
before it could do so, the Court had to clarify what in fact the Furman
decision required of a capital punishment sentencing scheme. The Court
clarified its Furman decision by stating that "Furman mandates that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as
the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared,
that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."58 Using this as the
Furman standard, the Court held that Georgia's use of a guided
discretion statute did in fact comply with the dictates of Furman. In
particular, the Court stated that Georgia's use of aggravating factors

53. For a list of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances used by the Model
Penal Code, see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193 n.44.
54. Of the five statutes which were challenged on that date, two were guided
discretion statutes, see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-66; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 24750 (1976), two were mandatory death penalty statutes, see Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329-31 (1976), and the
final statute could not be categorized as either, see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-69
(1976).
55. The "'76 cases" are: Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Jurek, 428
U.S. 262; Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; Roberts, 428 U.S. 325.
56. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
57. The statute challenged in Gregg required that the sentencing authority find
beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the ten statutory aggravating factors exists
before the sentencing authority was even permitted to consider the death penalty. Then,
once the sentencing authority had found at least one statutory aggravating factor, it was
directed to consider all evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the sentence of death
when deciding if the particular capital offender will be sentenced to death. Gregg, 428
U.S. at 164-66.
58. Id. at 189.
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guided and channeled the sentencing authority's discretion, and thereby
controlled, if not eliminated, the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the
death penalty which existed prior to Furman. 59 In Gregg, the Court
went on to announce that the concerns expressed in Furman could best
be "met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing
authority is given adequate information and guidance . . . and provided
with standards to guide its' use of the information."60 The Court's
decision in Gregg represents the first expressed, recognition of what
makes a constitutional death penalty statute and suggests that a guided
discretion statute which utilizes aggravating factors may well be the
preferred form of capital punishment statute.
Following Gregg, the Court next decided Proffitt v. Florida. 61 In
Proffitt, the Court used much of the same rationale that it employed in
Gregg to hold that the Florida guided discretion statute's use of
aggravating factors sufficiently guided and channeled the sentencing
authority's discretion.62 What the Court's decision in Proffitt added to
the Gregg decision was a statement of what the Constitution did not
require:
While the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities do not
have numerical weights assigned to them, the requirements of Furman are
satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and channeled by
requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against
imposition of the death penalty thus eliminating total arbitrariness and
capriciousness in its imposition. 6

59. Id. at 206-07.
60. Id. at 195.
61. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
62. Id. at 259-60.
63. Id. at 258. Proffitt is an important decision for another reason. In a footnote,
the Court suggests the possibility that a death sentence based entirely upon non-statutory
aggravating factors may be constitutionally flawed. Id. at 250 n.8. However, after
raising this issue the Court leaves it unresolved by relying upon Florida's statutory
language, which expressly limits the aggravating factors to those enumerated in the
statute. Id.
The Court returned to the issue of the constitutionality of using non-statutory
aggravating factors to sentence an offender to death in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939
(1983). The Court stated that its above-referenced statement in Proffitt questioned the
constitutionality of a sentence based entirely upon non-statutory aggravating factors.
Barclay, 463 U.S. at 956-57. However, the Court held that its statement in Proffitt saw
no constitutional defect in a death sentence that is based upon both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors. The Court then concluded that although the Florida death
penalty statute expressly prohibits the use of non-statutory aggravating factors, the
Constitution places no such requirement upon a death penalty statute. Id. Therefore the

605

Thus, the Court's decision in Proffitt reinforces the proposition that a
guided discretion statute provides a constitutionally adequate, if not the
preferred, response to the concerns addressed by the Court in Furman.
In Jurek v. Texas, 64 the third of the "'76 Cases" to be decided, the
Court examined a statute that did not expressly use aggravating factors
in an attempt to comply with the dictates of Furman. 65 However, in
holding that the Texas statute did satisfy the dictates of Furman, the
Court construed the statute as if it had used aggravating factors. The
Court stated that "[b]y narrowing its definition of capital murder, Texas
has essentially said that there must be at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance in a first-degree murder case before a death sentence may
even be considered."66 Through this holding, the Court further
confirmed the importance of the role of aggravating factors in a
constitutional death penalty statute. By using the paradigm of aggravating factors to analyze and explain why a statute which did not expressly
contain aggravating factors satisfied the mandates of Furman, the Court
implicitly endorsed them as possibly the best means available to guide
and channel a sentencing authority's discretion, and thus, comply with
the mandates of Furman.
In the final two "'76 Cases", Woodson v. North Carolina61 and
Roberts v. Louisiana,68 the Court ruled that mandatory death penalty

use ofnon-statutory aggravating factors in conjunction with statutory aggravating factors
does not violate the Constitution.
64. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
65. Id. at 268-69. The Texas statute's attempt to comply with Furman was a two
step process. First, the offenses for which the death penalty was a possible punishment
were narrowed. Second, prior to sentencing_a capital offender to death, the sentencing
authority had to respond to the following three statutory questions with an affirmative
answer:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
Id.
66. Id. at 276. The Court further stated that the state's "action in narrowing the
categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed serves much the
same purpose" as the aggravating factors used in the Georgia and Florida statutes. Id.
at 270. "In fact, each of the five classes of murders made capital by the Texas statute
is encompassed in Georgia and Florida by one or more of their statutory aggravating
circumstances." Id.
67. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
68. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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statutes were unconstitutional. These rulings were based upon three
grounds. First, a mandatory death penalty statute failed to comport with
contemporary societal values and thus violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 69 Second, a mandatory death penalty statute failed to
provide an adequate response to the mandates of Furman. 70 Third, a
mandatory death penalty statute failed to provide for individualized
sentencing; which the Court now considered to be a constitutional
requirement in a capital punishment sentencing scheme. Woodson and
Roberts mark the first time that the Supreme Court held that individualized . sentencing is a constitutional mandate rather than merely an
"enlightened policy."71 Thus, through its unequivocal rejection of
mandatory death penalty statutes, the Court further increased the
significance of the role that aggravating factors play in contemporary
death penalty jurisprudence.
Although none of these five "'76 Cases" clearly articulates what
components a constitutional death penalty statute is required to have,
when the cases are read together several important hints are given by the
Court as to what might be needed. First, the sentencing authority must
be directed to examine specific factors that argue in favor of or against

69.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288-301; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 332.
In Woodson, the Court stated:
The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the United States_ thus
reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all persons convicted of a
particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid.
The two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency respecting the
imposition of punishment in our society-jury determinations and legislative
enactments
both point conclusively to the repudiation of automatic death
sentences.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292-293.
70. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03 (due to the fact that throughout history
juries have repeatedly refused to convict on crimes that carry a mandatory death
sentence, North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute merely "papers over" the
problem of unfettered jury discretion and the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the
death penalty which existed prior to Furman); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-36.
71. In Woodson, the Court stated:
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations
generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional
imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (internal citation omitted); see also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333.
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the imposition of the death penalty.72
Second, the sentencing
authority's discretion to impose the death penalty must be limited or
narrowed so that the sentence of death is possible only for a subclass of
all offenders convicted of murder. 73 Third, the sentencing authority
must be permitted to consider the individual circumstances of both the
offender and the offense when exercising its discretion. 74 Finally,
although the "'76 Cases" did not expressly state that aggravating factors
must be used to perform these functions, the cases did state that if a
legislature used aggravating factors to perform these functions, their
death penalty statute would be deemed constitutional. 75 Therefore, as
a .practical matter, the Suprenie Court's decisions in the '"76 Cases"
forced most states to enact some form of guided discretion statute if they
wished to retain the death penalty as a sentencing option.76 This was
because the inclusion of aggravating factors was the only constitutional
means which the states had developed, to date,77 to impose the death
penalty. 78

72. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 257-58 (1976).
73. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270-74 (1976).
74. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04.
75. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258-60; Jurek, 428 U.S.
at 276-77.
76. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-2000 (1988); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 905-905.9 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994). Both North Carolina and Louisiana drafted
guided discretion statutes in response to their mandatory death penalty statutes being
rendered unconstitutional in Woodson and Roberts, respectively.
77. It is important to note that in the '"76 Cases" the Supreme Court expressed
that a guided discretion statute was not necessarily the only procedure which was
permissible under Furman and its dictates, but was just the only one that had been
developed to date. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
The Court has reiterated this sentiment several times in subsequent cases. For
example, in Lockett v. Ohio, the Court made the often-quoted statement that there can
be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be
used to impose death." 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). Furthermore, the Court has stated
that "in the context of capital punishment, the Constitution does not 'plac[e] totally
unrealistic conditions on its use."' McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987)
(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50).
78. In the '"76 Cases" the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of five
post-Furman death penalty statutes. Of the three statutes which the Supreme Court ruled
constitutional, two expressly utilized aggravating factors to comply with the dictates of
Furman. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-65; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 246-50. The third
constitutional statute, although it did not expressly utilize aggravating factors, was·
construed as though it did, and was thus held to be constitutional. See Jurek, 428 U.S.
at 269-71. In ruling that the remaining two statutes were unconstitutional the Supreme
Court held that mandatory death penalty statutes were not a constitutionally adequate
response to Furman. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 334-36 (1976). Therefore, following the '"76 Cases," the only way to ensure that
a death penalty statute was constitutionally adequate was to make it a guided discretion
statute which utilized aggravating factors.
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III.

AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND THE REFINEMENT OF THEIR ROLE
IN A CONSTITUTIONAL DEATH PENALTY STATUTE

Having established the foundation of modem capital punishment
jurisprudence in Furman and the "'76 Cases," the Supreme Court set out
to build upon that foundation. The Court sought to do this by defining
the role which aggravating factors must play in a constitutional death
penalty statute, as well as placing requirements on the manner in which
the factors themselves are defined. Consequently, the Court has
developed an extensive body of law establishing (1) the function which
aggravating factors are constitutionally mandated to perform and (2) the
amount of precision that must be utilized in defining each aggravating
factor. All of this acts to further ensure that each statute genuinely
provides a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
[the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not"79 and that the imposition of the death penalty in each case
complies with contemporary societal values. 80

A.

Aggravating Factors Must Genuinely Narrow the Class of
Persons Eligible for the Death Penalty

As previously noted, in the "'76 Cases," the Supreme Court held that
the sentencing authority's discretion to impose the death penalty "must
be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action." 81 In those cases the Court also
endorsed guided discretion statutes that utilized aggravating factors as
the preferred means to direct and limit the sentencing authority's
discretion. However, the Court did not clearly indicate the function
which aggravating factors perform, so as to enable the guided discretion
statutes to achieve that constitutional mandate. The exact function an

79.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,313 (1972)
(White, J., concurring)).
80.
Whether a challenged punishment comports with contemporary societal values
is the standard utilized to determine if that punishment is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See supra notes 20-33 and
accompanying text.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
81.
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aggravating factor is required to perform in a constitutional capital
punishment statute was therefore something the Court needed to clarify.
The Court first clearly addressed this issue in Zant v. Stephens. 82 In
Zant, the capital offender appealed his death sentence on several
grounds, one of which was that Georgia's capital punishment sentencing
scheme was unconstitutional because of the role which aggravating
factors played in that scheme.83 Prior to deciding this case, the
Supreme Court certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court
requesting-an explanation of the role of the state's aggravating factors. 84
Based upon the Georgia court's response, the Supreme Court concluded
that in the Georgia system the finding of an aggravating factor "does not
play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its
discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons
convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty." 5 The
respondent argued that the limited function performed by ·Georgia's
aggravating factors violated the dictates of Furman and thus rendered the
Georgia system unconstitutional.86 However, the Supreme Court did
not agree and held that Georgia's use of aggravating factors was
constitutional. 87
In denying the capital offender's claim, the Court stated that it had
already approved the Georgia system on its face in Gregg, but emphasized that its holding in Gregg rested upon "the fundamental requirement
that each statutory aggravating circumstance must satisfy a constitutional

82.
462 U.S. 862 (1983).
83. Id. at 874.
84.
The Georgia Supreme Court responded by analogizing its body of law
governing homicides to a pyramid. The base of the pyramid is formed by all cases in
which any form of homicide is charged. In the first plane above the base is the group
of all homicides which fall into the category of murder. The second plane separates
from all murder cases those particular cases in which capital punishment is a sentencing
option for the sentencing authority. This second plane is established by a list of ten
aggravating factors. Before a murder case can pass beyond this plane the sentencing
authority must find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the ten aggravating
factors exists. If this finding is not made, a murder case may not move past this plane
and the death penalty is then not a sentencing option. The final plane is that one which
separates all cases in which the death penalty is a sentencing option from those cases in
which it is actually imposed. ''There is an absolute discretion in the factfinder to place
any given case below the [final] plane and not impose death. The plane itself is
established by the factfinder. In establishing the plane, the factfinder considers all
evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment." Id. at 871.
Aggravating factors are not employed in making this final determination. As a final
limitation, all sentences of death are automatically reviewed by the Georgia Supreme
Court to ensure the sentence is not the product of prejudice or caprice. Id. at 870- 72.
85. Id. at 874.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 879-80.
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standard derived from the principles of Furman itself."88 That standard
was not clearly articulated in any of the '"76 Cases", but the Court now
announced it to be that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."89 Therefore,
after Zant, the only function that the Constitution required an aggravating factor to perform was to "genuinely narrow the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty."90 The Constitution did not require an
aggravating factor to do any more. 91
The Zant holding was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Lowenfield
v. Phelps. 92 In Lowenfield, the offender was sentenced to death under
the capital sentencing scheme of Louisiana.93 The petitioner appealed

88. Id. at 876.
89. Id. at 877. The Court went on to note that "[o]ur cases indicate ... that
statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage
of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty." Id. at 878.
90. Id. at 877. The Court has reiterated that the role of aggravating factors is to
narrow the class of offenders who are eligible for the death penalty. In the 1987 case,
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court summarized its holdings to date on the death penalty and
concluded:
[O]ur decisions since Furman have identified a constitutionally permissible
range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. First, there is a required
threshold below which the death penalty cannot be imposed. In this context,
the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's
judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet
the threshold.
McC!eskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303-05 (1987).
91. It is important to note that the sentencing authority must still be permitted to
consider all aspects of the defendant's record and the particular offense mitigating
against the imposition of the death penalty, as part of the individualized sentencing
mandated by Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976). However, the
Supreme Court's decisions have not required aggravating factors to perform any function
during that portion of the capital sentencing process.
92. 484 U.S. 231,244 (1988) ("To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing
scheme must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and
must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of murder."' (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 877)).
93. Lowenjield, 484 U.S. at 241-43. In response to its mandatory death penalty
statute being held unconstitutional in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976),
the Louisiana legislature redrafted its statute. It began by redefining homicide. It
established five categories of homicide and made the death penalty a sentencing option
in only its narrowly defined crime of first-degree murder. In order for the sentencing
authority to be permitted to convict an offender of first-degree murder, it must find that
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his death sentence on the grounds that the sole aggravating factor found
by the jury was identical to an element of the capital offense for which
he was convicted, namely that ''the offender knowingly created a risk of
death or great bodily harm to more than one person." 94 The Supreme
Court ,denied the petitioner's appeal and affirmed his death sentence. 95
In denying the petitioner's claims, the Court held that "[t]he use of
'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means of
genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and thereby
channeling the jury's discretion.''96 Therefore, it was constitutionally
irrelevant to the Lowen.field Court whether the narrowing function
performed by aggravating factors was accomplished by the jury during
the sentencing phase or the guilt phase of the trial, as long as it was
performed during some phase.97 All that the Constitution 'required was
that the class of persons eligible for the death penalty was genuinely
narrowed. 98 The Court noted that in order to satisfy this constitutional
dictate the capital sentencing laws of most states require the sentencing
authority to :find at least one aggravating factor before it may impose a
sentence of death. 99
The fact that all the Constitution requires of aggravating factors is that
they narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty was
further reinforced by the Court's holding in Blystone v. Pennsylvania. 100 In Blystone, the petitioner was sentenced to death based upon
the jury's finding of one aggravating factor, and the petitioner appealed.
The petitioner claimed that his sentence was unconstitutional because he
did not receive the sort of individualized sentencing that was constitutionally mandated. This claim was premised on the idea that because the
aggravating circumstances were not assigned weights, the jury was
"precluded from considering whether the severity of his aggravating

the facts of the offender's crime place it in one of five narrowly defined groups which
comprise the crime of first-degree murder. In Lowenfield, the jury found the petitioner
guilty of first-degree murder based upon the finding that he had "a specific intent to kill
or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person." Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at
243. Once an offender is convicted of first-degree murder, he is then sentenced by the
same jury in a separate proceeding. Before this jury can sentence an offender to death,
it must find at least one of Louisiana's ten statutory aggravating factors. Id. at 241-43.
94.
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 243.
Id. at 246.
95.
Id. at 244.
96.
97.
Id. at 244-45. As support for this statement the Court cited its approval of the
Texas capital sentencing scheme in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Id. See supra
notes 64-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Jurek decision.
98.
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244.
99.
100.
494 U.S. 299 (1990).
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circumstance warranted the death sentence." 101 The Supreme Court
rejected the petitioner's argument, holding that there was no constitutional requirement that the aggravating factors be assigned weights. 102 The
Court's reasoning was exemplified by its statement that "[t]he presence
of aggravating circumstances serves the purpose of limiting the class of
death-eligible defendants, and the Eighth Amendment does not require
that these aggravating circumstances be further refined or weighed by a
jury." 103 In reaching this holding, the Court firmly reinforced that the
only function the Constitution requires an aggravating factor to perform
is that it genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty.

B.

Aggravating Factors Must Not Be Unconstitutionally Vague

In order to further ensure that the constitutionally mandated narrowing
function is properly performed by an aggravating factor, the Supreme
Court has imposed an additional requirement on the use of aggravating
factors: they may not be defined in a constitutionally vague manner. All
guided discretion statutes are based upon the assumption that the
aggravating factors utilized are defined in a constitutionally permissible
fashion. If an aggravating factor is not defined in a constitutionally
permissible fashion, then the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty cannot be said to be genuinely narrowed. 104 The sentencing
authority would not be provided with sufficient guidance for determining
whether the factor is present in a particular case. 105 In the '"76 Cases,"
which approved of the use of aggravating factors to comply with the
dictates of the Constitution, 106 the Court expressly placed no requirement upon the manner in which the factors were defined, other than that
the factors not be too vague. In a footnote in its Gregg decision, the
Court stated that "[a] system could have standards so vague that they
would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of
juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
U.S. 242,

Id. at 306.
Id. at 306-08.
Id. at 306-07.
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926, 2928 (1992).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
259-60 (1976).

613

like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur." 107 Other than
this token requirement, the Court made no other mention of how
definitively each aggravating factor must be defined. Consequently, the
Court set out to clarify this aspect of the guided discretion statute.
The first case to truly address the manner in which an aggravating
factor was defined was Godfrey v. Georgia. 108 In Godfrey, the
petitioner was sentenced to death under the Georgia capital punishment
sentencing scheme approved by the Supreme Court in Gregg. 109 The
jury had sentenced the petitioner to death based upon its finding of one
aggravating factor, namely "that the offense of murder was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman." 110 The petitioner, seizing
upon the Court's above-referenced language from Gregg, 111 appealed
and challenged this aggravating factor as being so vague that it failed to
suitably direct and limit the sentencing authority's discretion, as the
Furman decision required. 112
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner and held that in this
particular case the construction which the Georgia courts had given to
this aggravating factor did in fact make the factor unconstitutionally
vague. It did not suitably direct or limit the sentencing authority's
discretion. 113 The Court found that "[a] person of ordinary sensibility
could fairly characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman"' and therefore, "[t]here is nothing
in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint on
the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence." 114
In arriving at this holding, the Court revealed two important requirements that the Constitution places upon the manner in which aggravating
factors are defined. First, the Court essentially applied the requirement
that was placed on the entire capital punishment sentencing scheme in
the "'76 Cases," namely that the sentencing authority's discretion be

107. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.46.
108. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
109. Id. at 422-23.
110. Id. at 426. The aggravating factor actually read that the offense "was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim," Id. at 422. The jury was instructed in
this language. Id. at 426. However, the jury returned the death sentence stating only
that "the offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."
Id. at 426. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the sentence stating that the language
used by the jury was "not objectionable" and that the evidence supported the finding.
Id. at 427.
111. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
112. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 423.
113. Id. at 432-33.
114. Id. at 428-29.
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suitably directed and limited to each aggravating factor that is utilized
by the scheme. The Court noted that if a state wished to authorize the
death penalty as a sentencing option it has a constitutional responsibility
not only to "tailor" its law, but also to "apply" its law in each case, so
as to avoid the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
penalty. 115 As part of this responsibility the state must "define the
crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates
'standardless [sentencing] discretion. "' 116 Therefore, in defining each
aggravating factor, the states must provide the sentencing authority with
"'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed
guidance"' to the sentencing authority in the exercise of its discretion.117 The state's failure to do so will result in the noncomplying
factor being deemed unconstitutionally vague.
Second, the Court suggested that even if the state did not adequately
define an aggravating factor, its deficient legislative definition could be
saved from being deemed unconstitutional if the state's courts applied
a sufficiently limiting construction to the factor. 118 The Court did not
expressly stat(:? that this was a method to "save" an unconstitutional
factor, but the means utilized by the Court to analyze the relevant
aggravating factor suggests this conclusion. Rather than merely
analyzing the amount of guidance provided by the legislature's definition
of the aggravating factor, the Court delved into the Georgia state courts'
application of the challenged factor. The Court found that in past capital
punishment cases, the Georgia Supreme Court had required additional
facts to be found in regards to this factor before it would permit a death
sentence to be based upon this aggravating factor. 119 However, in the

115. Id. at 428.
116. Id. at 428 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
117. Id. (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 422.
119. The Supreme Court found that all Georgia death sentences that had been
based upon this aggravating factor and had been affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court,
through its automatic appeal process, had one if not all three of the following findings
in addition to the finding of this aggravating factor:
(1) "[T]hat the evidence that the offense was 'outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman' had to demonstrate 'torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim";
(2) "[T]he phrase, 'depravity of mind,' comprehended only the kind of mental
state that led the murderer to torture or to commit an aggravated battery before
killing his victim"; and
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petitioner's case,. the Court found that neither the Georgia Supreme
Court, nor any other Georgia state court, had required any such
additional finding. Therefore, although the factor may have been
constitutionally applied in other cases, it was not constitutionally applied
in Godfrey because the construction applied provided no more guidance
than the vague language of the statute. 120 The Court therefore concluded that the ·factor was unconstitutionally vague as applied in this
case, but made no express pronouncement on the possibility of a limiting
construction "saving" an unconstitutionally vague factor.
In Maynard v. Cartwright121 the Court invalidated another aggravating factor on the ground that the factor was unconstitutionally vague.
In Maynard, one of the two aggravating factors upon which the
offender's death sentence was based was that the murder was "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel." 122 The respondent challenged this factor
as unconstitutionally vague and the Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court's ruling by holding that the factor was indeed invalid because it
was unconstitutionally vague. 123
In Maynard, the Court conducted essentially the same analysis as it
had in Godfrey before arriving at the conclusion that this aggravating
factor was unconstitutionally vague, at least as it was applied in this
case, because there was "no principled way to distinguish this case, in
which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it
was not." 124As in Godfrey, the aggravating factor in Maynard failed
to channel the sentencing authority's discretion by clear and objective
standards which provided specific and detailed guidance. 125 However,
the Court's conclusion that the aggravating factor was unconstitutionally
vague is not the only important holding in Maynard.

(3) "[T]hat the word, 'torture,' must be construed in pari materia with
'aggravated battery' so as to require evidence of serious physical abuse of the
victim before death."
Id. at 431.
120. Id. at 432. The Court stated:
[T]he validity of the petitioner's death sentences turns on whether, in light of
the facts and circumstances of the murders that he was convicted of committing, the Georgia Supreme Court can be said to have applied a constitutional
construction of the phrase "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
...." We conclude that the answer must be no.
Id. (footnote omitted).
121.
486 U.S. 356 (1988).
122. Id. at 359. The other aggravating factor was that the offender "knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person." Id. at 358-59.
123. Id. at 360.
124. Id. at 363 (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433).
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364.
125.
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The Court also expressly recognized that a limiting construction could
cure an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor. 126 While the
Court's analysis in Godfrey suggested this rule, 127 Maynard is the first
time that the Court explicitly recognized it. Thus, after Maynard, the
appropriate constitutional test involved the manner in which the
aggravating factor is applied by the courts, not the manner in which the
factor is defined by the legislature. Although the Court refused to state
what sort of limiting construction would be required to cure a deficient
factor, deferring that task to the Oklahoma state courts or legislature, 128
it is reasonable to assume that the limiting construction must meet the
same standard as the aggravating factor itself.
With these various standards in mind, the Court in Walton v.
Arizona 129 established the inquiry that a federal court must undertake
when it is determining whether a particular aggravating factor is
unconstitutionally vague. First, the court must "determine whether the
statutory language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to
provide any guidance to the sentencer." 130 Second, if the language is
too vague the court must "attempt to determine whether the state courts
have further defined the vague terms and, if they have done so, whether
those definitions are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide
some guidance to the sentencer." 131 If the court determines that the
aggravating factor fails both of.these inquiries then it is .deemed to be
unconstitutionally vague.
Thus, in addition to using their aggravating factors in a manner that
genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, the
states must also define their aggravating factors in a manner that is not

126.

Id. at 362. The Court stated that because the challenged aggravating factor

was unconstitutionally vague on its face and the state courts had not "adopted a limiting
construction that cured the infirmity," the challenged aggravating factor violated the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 360.
127. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
128. Maynard, 483 U.S. at 365.
129. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
130. Id. at 654. If the sentencer's discretion is channeled by clear and objective
standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, then the sentencer is provided with
sufficient guidance and this constitutional requirement is met. See Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420,428 (1980); see also supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
Walton, 497 U.S. at 654.
131.
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unconstitutionally vague. 132 In respect to this requirement, the Court
has recognized that the "proper degree of definition" of most aggravating
factors is ''not susceptible of mathematical precision," 133 however, what
is essentially required is that the description of the factor not be "so
vague as to leave the sentencer without sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the factor." 134 If the sentencing
authority is provided with "'clear and objective standards' that provide
'specific and detailed guidance"' in the exercise of its discretion, the
factor will pass constitutional muster. 135 However, it is important to
note that the true test is not necessarily that the legislature's definition
meets this standard, but that the state courts' application of the factor
meets this standard. Regardless of the adequacy of the legislative
definition, if the application of an aggravating factor does not meet this
standard it will be deemed to be unconstitutionally vague. 136

IV.

TUILAEPA V. CALIFORNIA: AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND THE
SELECTION PHASE OF CAPITAL SENTENCING

As the aforesaid cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court has spent a
great deal of time developing the requirements which the Constitution
places upon a capital punishment statute. After analyzing the entire
process utilized to sentence an offender to death in the "'76 Cases," the
Court switched its focus to the individual aspects of the capital
sentencing process and has not returned to examine the process as a
whole. As a result, the requirements the Court has developed for these
individual aspects have not been placed in the broader context of the
entire capital sentencing process. However, if the Court's decisions are
read in conjunction with one another, they reveal that the capital
sentencing process is in fact comprised of two distinct phases: the
eligibility phase and the selection phase. 137 The Court's decisions have
not truly recognized or developed this distinction because of their focus
on the components instead of the entire process.
The essence of the process revealed by the Court's decisions is that
there are two very different determinations which must be made before
the death penalty can be imposed upon an offender. First, the Court's

132. See, e.g., Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432-33; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 867
(1983); Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64; Walton, 497 U.S. at 654; Stringer v. Black, 503
U.S. 222, 228 (1992); Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct 2926, 2928 (1992).
Walton, 497 U.S. at 655.
133.
134. Esptnosa, 112 S. Ct. at 2928.
135.
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (footnote omitted).
136.
See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
137.
Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (1994).
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opinions suggest that the sentencing authority must determine that the
offender is in fact part of a narrow class of murderers 138 eligible for
the death penalty. 1 9 This determination entails a decision by the
sentencing authority whether at least one of a statutory list of aggravating factors exists in the particular case and thus sets it apart from the
many cases in which the death penalty is not imposed. 140 Second, the
Court's opinions suggest that some specific aspect of the offender's
crime or character must warrant him being sentenced to death as
opposed to imprisoned for life. The Court has stated that ''the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty
of death." 141 However, the Court's decisions have not clearly addressed the relationship between these two determinations. 142
In fact, the Court's opinions have focused almost exclusively on the
eligibility determination and whether it was properly made in a particular
case. 143 Consequently, the requirements developed by the Court for a
constitutional capital punishment statute have focused on the eligibility
decision, ensuring that the constitutionally mandated narrowing function
is performed. 144 These cases have not expressly limited their holdings

138. Again, this Comment only deals with the death penalty as a punishment for
the crime of murder.
139. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78 (1983).
140. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980). The Court stated that there
must be a "principled way to distinguish [the cases] in which the death penalty [is]
imposed, from the many cases in which it [is] not." Id.
141. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (citations omitted).
142. In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), the Court suggested that there was
an eligibility and a selection phase to the process of sentencing an offender to death.
However in Zant, the Court did not expand on this suggestion and it did not return to
this suggestion until its Tuilaepa decision. The extent of the Court's discussion of this
distinction in Zant is as follows:
Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circumstances play a
constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they
circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. . . . What is
important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis ·
of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.
Id. at 878-79.
143. See supra notes 79-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
requirements which the Constitution places upon aggravating factors as they are utilized
in the eligibility phase of capital sentencing.
144. See supra notes 79-136 and accompanying text for the discussion of those
requirements.
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to the eligibility phase, but as this Comment indicates, that was the clear
implication. Some of the Court's decisions do mention the selection
decision, but this is typically only in passing and do not develop
requirements on how that decision is to be made. 145
However, in the recent case of Tuilaepa v. California 146 the Supreme
Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a death sentence that
forced the Court to analyze and develop the distinction· between these
two phases and what each requires of an aggravating factor. In
Tuilaepa, the defendant was sentenced to death pursuant to the
California capital sentencing scheme. 147 The defendant appealed his
death sentence claiming that three of the aggravating factors used in the
California capital punishment statute were unconstitutionally vague. 148
Under California law, the process of sentencing an offender to death
is comprised of two parts: the trial and the sentencing hearing.· At the
trial, the trier of fact 149 is required to make two separate findings

The Court's emphasis on the eligibility phase is due in large part to the fact that nearly
all of the Court's decisions analyzing aggravating factors have dealt with challenges to
capital punishment statutes that utilized the same set of aggravating factors in both the
eligibility and the selection phase of capital sentencing. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Clemons v. Mississippi,
494 U.S. 738 (1990). Therefore, the Court has had no real need to develop a set of
requirements for each phase of the capital sentencing process that utilized aggravating
factors.
145. The cases that speak of the selection phase of sentencing do not discuss the
role that aggravating factors must perform in that stage. Instead, they discuss what the
Constitution requires of that phase in general. In particular, those cases discuss the
constitutional requirement that the offender must receive individualized sentencing and
that during that process the sentencing authority must not be prohibited from considering
all relevant mitigating factors. See, e.g., Woodson, at 303-05; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604-05 (1978); Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79; McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 30506 (1987). In Blystone v. Pennsylvania, the Court went so far as to state that "[t]he
requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury
to consider all relevant mitigating evidence." 494 U.S. 299, 307 (1990). Thus, none of
the Supreme Court cases discussing the selection phase of capital sentencing have made
any mention of the function aggravating factors must perform during that phase.
146.
114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994).
Tuilaepa is actually a consolidated case. Tuilaepa v. California, ll4 S. Ct.
147.
598 (1993). The Supreme Court consolidated Tuilaepa v. California, docket number 935131, and Proctor v. California, docket number 93-5161, because the two cases
presented the identical constitutional question: are the specified aggravating factors used
by the California sentencing authority to sentence the defendant to death unconstitutionally vague. This Comment will only discuss the defendant in Tuilaepa
because he challenged three of California's factors, while the defendant in Proctor only
challenged one factor and that factor is one that the defendant in Tuilaepa also
challenged.
148.
Tuilaepa, ll4 S. Ct. at 2632.
149. The trier of fact shall be a jury unless the defendant has voluntarily waived
this right. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.4 (West 1988).
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before the offender can even be eligible for the death penalty. 15° First,
the trier of fact must convict the offender of first-degree murder. 151
Second, the trier of fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt that at
least one of the statutorily enumerated "special circumstances" exists in
the case. 152 If the offender is found guilty of first-degree murder, but
the trier of fact does not find at least one "special circumstance," the
offender is not eligible for the death penalty.
The case then proceeds to the sentencing hearing, provided that both
of the requisite findings were made during the trial stage. At the
sentencing hearing, a separate proceeding is conducted and the trier of
fact 153 is presented with all evidence in aggravation and mitigation of
the offender's sentence. After hearing all of the evidence, the trier of
fact is given another list of enumerated factors and instructed to
weigh 154 all of the relevant factors that aggravate in favor of the death

150.
CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.1 (West 1988).
151.
First-degree murder is defined in CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1994).
152.
CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 190.2, 190.4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
At the trial, the offender is charged with first-degree murder and any of the 19 "special
circumstances" that the prosecution believes are present in the case. The prosecution and
the defense then present evidence as to both the charge of first-degree murder and all
of the "special circumstances" charged. If the trier of fact finds the offender guilty of
first-degree murder, it must make a special finding in regards to each "special
circumstance" charged in the case, stating whether the trier found each to be true or
false. In order for a special circumstance to be deemed true, the trier of fact must find
that it exists beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
The 19 "special circumstances" are enumerated in § 190.2 and include such things as
the murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain, the victim was a peace
officer, or the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in any one of a
list of nine felonies. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
153.
During the sentencing hearing, the trier of fact is a jury unless the offender
and the prosecution waive the right to a jury. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.4 (West 1988).
154. The fact that California requires its sentencing authority to "weigh" the
aggravating factors against the mitigating factors, in order to determine which offenders
shall be sentenced to death, makes California a weighing state.
In general, there are two types of guided discretion statutes: weighing and nonweighing. The sentencing authority in a state that employs a weighing statute is required
to weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors and determine whether the
evidence favors the offender being sentenced to death or life imprisonment. In essence,
what each member of the sentencing authority is required to do is to "mentally balance"
the aggravating and mitigating factors in a qualitative fashion. This is in contrast to a
quantitative balancing in which the sentencing authority would simply say that the
offender should be sentenced to death because there are three aggravating factors and
only two mitigating factors. People v. Howard, I Cal. 4th 1132, 1188, 824 P.2d 1315,
1348, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 301 (1992).
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The sentencing authority in a state that employs a non-weighing statute is not required
to perform this analysis. Instead, the sentencing authority is only required to find
aggravating factors as a threshold matter to determine which offenders are eligible for
the death penalty. If at least one aggravating factor is found to exist, the offender is
deemed to be eligible for the death penalty and the sentencing authority then "considers
all evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment" when determining
which offenders will be sentenced to death. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870-73
(1983). Once an offender is deemed to be eligible for the death penalty, the sentencing
authority is not required to perform any sort of weighing analysis. All that is required
is that it considers all of the relevant evidence.
Presently 38 states have death penalty statutes on their books. Of those states, 23
employ weighing statutes while 13 employ non-weighing statutes. The statutes in the
remaining two states can be categorized as neither weighing nor non-weighing.
The 23 states that employ a weighing statute and their statutory provisions establishing
the procedure to be followed when sentencing an offender to death are set out below:
I. Alabama, see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to 13A-5-59 (1994).
2. Arkansas, see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-601 to 5-4-618 (Michie 1993).
3. California, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1-190.9 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
4. Colorado, see Cow. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 16-11-103 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
5. Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1987 & Supp. 1992).
6. Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
7. Idaho, see IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987).
8. Indiana, see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Bums Supp. 1994).
9. Kansas, see 1994 Kansas Sess. Laws Ch. 252 § 4(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 214625, 21-4626 (Supp. 1993).
10. Maryland, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (Supp. 1993).
11. Mississippi, see MISS. CODE ANN.§§ 99-19-101, 99-19-103 (1994).
12. Missouri, see Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.030-565.040 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
13. Nebraska, see NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2519 to 29-2528 (1989).
14. Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.030-200.035 (Michie 1992 & Supp.
1993).
15. New Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (Supp. 1993).
16. New Jersey, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c) (West Supp. 1994).
17. New Mexico, see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-14, 31-18-15.1, 31-20A-l to 3120A-6 (Michie 1994).
18. New York, see 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1, § 20 (codified at N.L. PENAL LAW
§ 60.06; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27).
19. North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1988).
20. Ohio, see Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-2929.05 (Baldwin 1992).
21. Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.10-701.15 (West 1983 & Supp.
1994).
22. Pennsylvania, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
23. Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-204 to 39-13-206, 39-13-208 (Supp.
1994).
The 13 states that employ a non-weighing statute and their statutory provisions are as
follows:
I. Arizona, see ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 1993).
2. Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-46a to 53a-46b (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994).
3. Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Harrison Supp. 1993).
4. Illinois, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
5. Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Baldwin Supp. 1993).
6. Louisiana, see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905-905.9 (West 1984 & Supp.
1994).
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penalty against those factors that mitigate against the death penalty. 155

Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301 to 46-18-310 {1993).
South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN.§§ 16-3-20, 16-3-25 {Law. Co-op. 1985 &
Supp. 1993).
. 9. South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-27A-1 to 23A-27A-14
(1988 & Supp. 1994).
10. Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206 to 76-3-207, 76-5-202 {Supp. 1994).
11. Virginia, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2 to 19.2-264.4 {Michie 1990 & Supp.
7.
8.

1994).

12. Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 10.95.020-10.95.150 {West 1990 &
Supp. 1994).
13. Wyoming, see WYO. STAT. §§ 6-2-102 to 6-2-103 {Supp. 1994).
The remaining two states, which can be categorized as neither weighing nor nonweighing, are as follows:
1. Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 {1990).
2. Texas, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.37.071-37.0711 (West Supp. 1994).
The states which currently do not employ the death penalty are as follows: Alaska,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The District of Columbia also does not
currently employ capital punishment. See Patricia Mitchell, Executions in America,
L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at A5 (chart). The article cited lists New York as not having
the death penalty. However, in March of 1995, New York enacted a capital punishment
statute which is set to go into effect on September 1, 1995. 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1, sess.
2850, art. 4843, §§ 20, 38.
155. This list of 11 factors, which is contained in California Penal Code § 190.3,
is as follows:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in
the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found
to be true pursuant to section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or
implied threat to use force or violence.
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal
conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the
defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his
conduct.
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another person.
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or
the affects of intoxication.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his
participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
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If the trier of fact finds that the factors which weigh in favor of the
death penalty outweigh the factors which mitigate against it, then the
trier is required to impose the death penalty. 15 If the trier finds that
the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors, the trier is
required to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. 157 In making this
determination, the sentencing authority is not required to specify which
aggravating and mitigating factors it found, but only that the aggravating
factors outweigh the mitigating factors or vice versa. 158 Thus, under
the California capital sentencing scheme the sentencing authority must
consider two separate lists of aggravating factors before it is permitted
to sentence the offender to death. 159
In Tuilaepa, the jury found at the trial that the defendant was guilty
of first-degree murder and that the one "special circumstance" charged
by the prosecution was true. 160 At the sentencing hearing, the defendant was unanimously sentenced to death by the jury based upon its
finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.161 On automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court, the

(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.3 (West 1988).
156.
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 376-77 (1990). The Supreme Court has
upheld the mandatory "shall impose" language of the California statute, holding that
there is no constitutional requirement that the sentencing authority be given the freedom
to decline to impose the death penalty when the sentencing authority decides that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Id.
157.
California Penal Code Section 190.3 provides that:
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after having heard
and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of fact shall consider, take
into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of
fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. If the trier offact determines that the mitigating circumstances
outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a
sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
158. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.4 (West 1988).
159.
One list of aggravating factors is considered during the trial and a separate list
of aggravating factors is considered during the sentencing hearing. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 190.2-190.4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
160. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (1994). The special
circumstance that the jury found to be true in Tuilaepa was that the murder was
committed during the commission of a robbery. Id.
In Proctor the jury found three special circumstances to be true. Those "special
circumstances" were: (1) that the murder was committed during the commission of a
rape, (2) that the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary, and (3)
that the murder included the infliction of torture. Id.
161. Id. In Proctor, the jury also unanimously sentenced the defendant to death.

Id.
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defendant argued that three of the aggravating factors upon which the
jury was instructed during the sentencing hearing were unconstitutionally
vague. 162 The three aggravating factors which the defendant challenged were enumerated in -California Penal Code section 190.3,
subsections (a), (b) and (i). 163 However, the California Supreme Court
affirmed the defendant's death sentence, holding that the challenged
factors were not unconstitutionally vague because they "direct the
sentencer's attention to specific, provable, and commonly understandable
facts about the defendant and the capital crime that might bear on his
moral culpability." 164
Following the California Supreme Court's decision, the defendant
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. It is
important to note that at no stage of his appeal did the defendant
challenge the "special circumstance'' found at the trial stage which made
him eligible for the death penalty. 165 Consequently, the only question

162. People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 594, 842 P.2d 1142, 1157, 15 Cal. Rptr.
2d 382, 397 (1992). On the automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court in
Proctor, the defendant challenged one of these aggravating factors as unconstitutionally
vague. People v. Proctor, 4 Cal. 4th 499, 550-51, 842 P.2d 1100, 1130, 15 Cal. Rptr.
2d 340, 370 (1992).
163. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (1994).
These three factors were:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in
the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found
to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or
implied threat to use force or violence.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 {West 1988).
The defendant in Proctor only challenged factor (a). Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2637.
164. People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 595, 842 P.2d 1142, 1157-58, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 382, 397-98 (1992). The California Supreme Court went on to conclude that
"[h]aving met these standards of relevance and specificity, factors (a), (b), and (i) are not
'illusory' or otherwise impermissibly 'vague."' Id. at 595, 842 P.2d at 1158, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 398 (construing Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1992)).
In Proctor, the defendant only challenged factor (a) and, in affirming the defendant's
death sentence, the California Supreme Court held that "[t]he United States Supreme
Court itself has established that the circumstances surrounding a capital offense
constitute one of the criteria upon which the jury should base its penalty determination."
People v. Proctor, 4 Cal. 4th 499, 551, 842 P.2d 1100, 1130, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 340, 370
(1992).
165. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2636 (1994).
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which the Supreme Court agreed to hear was the defendant's claim that
three of the aggravating factors used in California's sentencing hearing
were unconstitutionally vague, and therefore, it was improper to instruct
the sentencing authority as to those factors. 166
The defendant's case was unique because it presented a problem with
which the Court had never dealt. The aggravating factors that the
defendant challenged are utilized only to select which offenders will be
sentenced to death. These factors do not determine which offenders are
eligible for the death penalty. In fact, the challenged aggravating factors
are not even considered until after a separate set of aggravating factors
has been utilized to determine that the offender is indeed eligible. This
was unique, because all of the previous challenges to aggravating factors
that the Court has heard were concerned with aggravating factors that
determined which offenders were eligible for the death penalty, in
addition to which offenders would be selected to receive the death
penalty. 167 Therefore, prior to examining the merits of the defendant's
vagueness challenge, the Court had to examine the two-phase capital
sentencing process in order to determine what is required of an
aggravating factor used solely during the selection phase.
In order to distinguish between the two phases of the capital sentencing process, the Court had to :finally place all of the requirements that it
had developed over the past twenty years into the broader context of the
capital sentencing process as a whole. The results of this examination
were fourfold. First, the Court expressly recognized that its cases did in
fact.reveal this two-stage process of sentencing an offender to death, and
that each of these two phases requires something different from an
aggravating factor. 168 Second, during the eligibility phase of the
capital sentencing process, an aggravating factor must genuinely narrow
the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty. 169 Third, during
the selection phase of the capital sentencing process, an aggravating
factor must provide the sentencing authority with the means by which
to make an individualized determination of which offenders will be

166. Id. at 2633. In delivering the opinion of the Court Justice Kennedy stated that
this case presents ''the question whether three of the § 190.3 penalty-phase factors are
unconstitutionally vague under decisions of this Court construing the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment." Id.
167.
See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862 (1983); Maynard
Cartwright1 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Lowenfield v. Phelps,
484 U.S. 231 (1988); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
168.
Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2634-36.
169. Id. at 2634-35.
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sentenced to death and which will not. 17 Finally, regardless of which
phase of the capital sentencing process the sentencing authority considers
an aggravating factor, that factor cannot be unconstitutionally vague.
This requirement is imposed because the underlying principle of the
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence is that the sentencing
process must minimize the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty. Therefore, in addition to meeting the requirements placed
upon an aggravating factor, a factor must also act to minimize the
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty by not being
unconstitutionally vague. 171
Thus, having established what was required of an aggravating factor
in each phase of the capital sentencing process, the Court's next task was
to determine what standards would be used to decide if these requirements were met. In particular, the Court needed to determine the
appropriate standard to be used to decide if an eligibility or selection
phase factor is unconstitutionally vague. The Court completed this task
very quickly by simply announcing the standard it was going to use,
without analysis or discussion as to how the standard was developed.
The standard which the Court announced was that "a factor is not
unconstitutional if it has some 'common-sense core of meaning ... that
criminal juries should be capable of understanding. "'172
After announcing this broadly-stated standard, the Court used it to
examine the defendant's vagueness challenge to the three California
selection phase aggravating factors. The Court's application of its newly
stated standard was comgrised of little more than simply restating the
three challenged factors 73 and concluding that the factors were not
unconstitutionally vague because they were "phrased in conventional and
understandable terms." 174 As support for its conclusion that the

170. Id. at 2635. See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05
(1976); supra note 71 and accompanying text.
171. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635.
172. Id. at 2635-36 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,279 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring)).
173. See supra note 163 for a list of the factors challenged in Tuilaepa.
174. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2637.
In particular the Court held: factor (a) was not unconstitutionally vague because it
was phrased "in understandable terins"; factor (b) was not unconstitutionally vague
because it was "phrased in conventional and understandable terms"; and factor (i) was
not unconstitutionally vague because the petitioner's challenge was not really a
vagueness challenge, rather it was merely a complaint that the application of factor (i)
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challenged factors were not unconstitutionally vague, the Court stated
that the subject matter which the three factors directed the sentencing
authority to consider had all been previously approved by the Court as
information which is relevant to the process of sentencing an offender
to death. 175 Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
California Supreme Court, as well as the defendant's death sentence. 176
V.

LIMITATION OF THE "COMMON SENSE" STANDARD

The holding of the Court's decision in Tuilaepa is that the three
challenged selection phase aggravating factors are not unconstitutionally
vague because they possess some "common-sense core of meaning . . .
that criminal juries should be capable of understanding." 177 However,
after taking great efforts in its opinion to clarify the requirements that
each phase of the capital sentencing process places upon an aggravating
factor, the Court fails to clearly articulate whether this "common-sense"
standard applies to aggravating factors utilized in the eligibility phase,
the selection phase, or both phases of the capital sentencing process.
The Court simply announces that "a factor" is unconstitutionally vague
if it does not meet this "common-sense" standard. 178 Therefore, for
the five reasons which follow, this Comment argues that the "commonsense" standard which the Court announced in Tuilaepa should only be
used to determine whether aggravating factors in the selection phase of
the capital sentencing process are unconstitutionally vague.
First, it is proper to limit the "common-sense" standard to the selection
phase of the capital sentencing process because the only issue on which
the Court granted certiorari was the constitutional validity of three of
California's selection phase aggravating factors. 179 Furthermore, the
Court expressly stated that it was not addressing any aspect of
California's eligibility phase because the defendant had not challenged

was difficult. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that there was "no constitutional deficiency
in factor (i)." Id. at 2637-38.
175. Id. The prior decisions which the Court refers to as support for its conclusion
were: Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (holding that the
"consideration of ... the circumstances of the particular offense [is] ... a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death"); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (explaining that the sentencer is permitted to consider the
offender's past criminal record in determining his future dangerousness); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1982) (explaining that the age of the offender may be
a relevant factor in the sentencing decision).
176. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2639.
177. Id. at 2636 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring)).
178. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635-36.
179. Id.
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on appeal the validity of any of the eligibility phase aggravating
factors. 18
Consequently, if a court applies the "common-sense"
standard to both eligibility and selection phase aggravating factors,
which it should not, the application to the eligibility phase would be
unprecedented.
Second, limiting the applicability of the "common-sense" standard
exclusively to the selection phase is necessary in order to ensure that it
is a viable standard which does not conflict with any of the settled
principles of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As the
Tuilaepa decision reinforces, during the eligibility phase, the class of
offenders which are eligible for the death penalty must be genuinely
narrowed, while during the selection phase the determination of which
offenders will be sentenced to· death must be made on an individualized
basis after considering the character of the offender and the circumstances of the crime. 181 To ensure that these two functions are in fact
performed, and performed in a manner that is not arbitrary or capricious,
the further requirement that an aggravating factor utilized at either stage
of the capital sentencing process not be unconstitutionally vague is
imposed. 1 2 Therefore, the standards used to determine whether an
-aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague must ensure that the
sentencing authority is provided with meaningful guidance when
performing each of these functions. 183
The "common-sense" standard simply does not ensure that during the
eligibility phase the sentencing authority is provided with meaningful
guidance. During the eligibility phase, an objective determination is
made by the sentencing authority as to whether certain aggravating
factors exist in a particular case. This determination is made in order to
ensure that the constitutionally mandated narrowing function is

°

180. Id. at 2636.
181. See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
183.
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (stating that "[a] capital
sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not"')
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (stating that "the concerns expressed in Furman
that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met
by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate
information and guidance").
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performed and performed in a rationally reviewable fasbion. 184
However, a vagueness standard tied to a juror's common-sense is a very
subjective standard and fails to ensure that an objective determination
can be made as to whether a given aggravating factor exists. Thus, the
constitutionally mandated narrowing function would not be performed
in a rationally reviewable manner by an aggravating factor that is only
required to have a "common-sense core of meaning." Jurors would then
be permitted to differ as to what is needed to determine that the
aggravating factor does in fact exist in a particular case. Therefore, the
use of the "common-sense" standard to determine whether an eligibility
phase aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague would inhibit rather
than ensure that the function of the eligibility phase is performed.
However, the "common-sense" standard does ensure that the
sentencing authority is provided with meaningful guidance during the
selection phase. This is because the determination to be made by the
sentencing authority during the selection phase is a much more
subjective determination. Here the sentencing authority is not making
the objective determination of whether specific aggravating factors exist,
but instead is making the more subjective determination of whether all
aspects of the crime and the offender's character warrant sentencing the
offender to death. 185 This determination is permitted to be a more
subjective standard. In order to even reach this stage, the offender must
be convicted of first-degree murder and an aggravating factor that
genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty
must have been found by the sentencing authority. Hence, the vagueness
standard utilized to judge selection phase aggravating factors is not

184.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (explaining that

Furman's "basic requirement" is that arbitrary and capricious jury discretion must be
replaced "with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable
the process for imposing a sentence of death."); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (stating that
"[p]art of a State's responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes for which death
may be the sentence in a way that obviates 'standardless [sentencing] discretion' ... and
that 'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death"').
185. This is the point in the capital sentencing process where· the distinction
between a weighing and a non-weighing statute is relevant. Under a weighing statute,
the .subjective determination the sentencing authority makes at this point must be guided
by a ''mental balancing" process. See supra note 152. Under a non-weighing statute the
sentencing authority makes the same subjective determination, but under this paradigm
the decision is guided by the simple consideration of all evidence in "extenuation,
mitigation and aggravation.of punishment." See supra note 152.
This Comment only addresses the applicability of the Court's "common-sense"
vagueness standard in the context of a weighing jurisdiction because that is the context
in which that standard was announced in Tuilaepa, namely, California's weighing statute.
This Comment expresses no opinion on whether that "common-sense" standard is
applicable in a non-weighing jurisdiction.
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required to ensure that an aggravating factor is defined in a manner that
allows the sentencing authority to make an objective determination of
whether it exists. Instead, the standard must ensure that the sentencing
authority understands the factors it is directed to consider so that the
offender is sentenced on an individualized basis as mandated by the
Constitution. Therefore, it is not only proper but necessary to limit the
applicability of the "common-sense" standard to the selection phase. To
do otherwise would allow the fundamental principles of the Court's
death penalty jurisprudence to be violated.
Third, it is appropriate to have two distinct vagueness standards
because the function an aggravating factor performs in each phase
demands a different level of precision in factor definition. The
narrowing function the eligibility phase performs requires the aggravating factors to be defined with a sufficient level of precision so that the
factors will genuinely narrow the class of persons. eligible for the death
penalty. The individualized sentencing determination the selection phase
performs requires the aggravating factors to be defined in terms that the
sentencing authority is capable of understanding, so that it knows which
characteristics of the offender and crime to consider in making this
determination. The eligibility phase inherently requires a higher degree
of precision in definition of the aggravating factors, and therefore, the
standard utilized in that phase is necessarily a higher one. 186 An
aggravating factor can be defined in terms that an ordinary juror could
understand and still not genuinely narrow the class of person eligible for
the death penalty. Consequently, it is appropriate to require two
different levels of precision in defining the aggravating factors.
Fourth, the authority the Court cites only supports this "commonsense" standard if the standard's applicability is limited to the selection
phase of the capital sentencing process. The two cases cited by the
Court for its proposition that this "common-sense" standard is to be used
to determine whether an aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague
were Maynard v. Cartwright and Godfrey v. Georgia. 187 However, in

186. Due to the eligibility phase standard being a higher standard, the selection
phase standard rarely is considered. This is because a vast majority of the statutes utilize
the same factors in both the eligibility and selection phases. Thus, once the factors are
deemed to meet the eligibility phase standard there is no need to consider the selection
phase standard.
187. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2636 (1994). The Court stated that
it has relied on this "basic principle" when it has found any aggravating factors to be
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those two cases, the Court did not expressly use this standard to hold the
challenged aggravating factors unconstitutionally vague.
Both Maynard and Godfrey held that the challenged factors were
unconstitutionally vague because they failed to channel the sentencing
authority's discretion by clear and objective standards, not because they
lacked a common-sense core of meaning. 188 Arguably, the use of the
"common-sense" standard would render the factors challenged in
Maynard and Godfrey unconstitutionally vague. 189 However, it is
simply not the standard utilized by the Court to arrive at that conclusion
in those cases. In fact, both cases are conspicuously absent any
reference to Justice White's concurring opinion in Jurek, from which the
"common-sense" standard is derived. 190 The only reference to the
Court's Jurek decision at all appears buried in a "see also" string cite in
Godfrey. 191 Furthermore, the Court's examination of the challenged
aggravating factors in Maynard and Godfrey was limited to the eligibility
stage of sentencing. In Godfrey, the Court held that the challenged
aggravating factor was invalid because it failed to limit the class of
murderers eligible for the death penalty at the eligibility phase of capital
sentencing. 192 In Maynard, the Court held that the challenged factor
was invalid for the identical reason. 193 Therefore, in announcing this
"common-sense" standard, the Tuilaepa Court cites no authority which
would support the application of this standard to aggravating factors
utilized in the eligibility phase. However, because Tuilaepa is the first

unconstitutionally vague. Id. As examples of its use of this "basic principle," the Court
references Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420 (1980). Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2636.
188. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (stating that "[t]here is nothing in these few
words, standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death sentence"); Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64 (explaining that "the
language of the Oklahoma aggravating circumstance at issue .. • . gave no more guidance
than the ... language" utilized in Godfrey). See also supra notes 108-128 and
accompanying text.
189. In Godfrey and Maynard the Court stated that its reason for holding the
challenged aggravating factors unconstitutional was that the factors failed to adequately
channel the sentencing authority's discretion. See supra note 188. Although the Court
did not use the "common-sense" standard in Godfrey and Maynard, the challenged
factors could be said to lack a "common-sense core of meaning." The Court, however,
made no reference to this "common-sense" standard in either decision.
190. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
191. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
192. See id. at 433 (holding that "[t]here is no principled way to distinguish this
case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was
not").
193. See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364 (concluding that the challenged factor was
invalid because an ordinary person could honestly believe that said factor applied in
every murder case).
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decision by the Court addressing a challenge to aggravating factors used
solely in the selection phase, the fact that there is no authority to support
the use of the "common-sense" standard does not preclude its use if it
is limited strictly to the selection phase.
Finally, as previous sections of this Comment have indicated, the
Supreme Court -has already set forth a vagueness standard to evaluate
aggravating factors that perform the eligibility phase's narrowing
function. 194 That standard is that an aggravating factor "must channel
the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide
'specific and detailed guidance."' 195 The Court's decisions have
implicitly limited this standard's applicability to the eligibility phase
because that is the context in which it was developed and has been the
only context in which it has been applied. 196 This well settled vagueness standard is not expressly overruled by the Court's decision in
Tuilaepa. In fact, it does not even refer to it. Therefore, given this
context, it is appropriate to limit the "common-sense" standard to the
selection phase because doing so fills a void highlighted by the Court
clearly differentiating between the two phases of the capital sentencing
process; such an interpretation also avoids overruling a well settled
standard by implication alone.
Thus, with its decision in Tuilaepa, the Supreme Court clearly
articulates that there are indeed two stages to the process of sentencing
an offender to death and that each stage has its own distinct set of
requirements placed upon aggravating factors. In the eligibility phase,
an aggravating factor must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible
for the death penalty. 197 Typically, this requirement is satisfied if the
sentencing authority is provided with a principled means of distinguishing the cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many in
which it is not. 198 In the selection phase, the aggravating and mitigating factors together must ensure that the offender is sentenced on an

194. See supra notes 104-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of that
standard.
195. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (citations omitted); see also supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
196. See Godfrey, 428 U.S. 420; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); see also
supra notes 104-36 and accompanying text.
197. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2635 (1994).
198. Zant, 462 U.S. at 876-78.
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individualized basis. 199 This requirement is satisfied in a weighing
jurisdiction by requiring the sentencing authority to weigh the aggravating factors found in the case against the mitigating factors.
Regardless of the phase in which an aggravating factor is utilized, it
cannot be unconstitutionally vague. If it is, the factor is likely to lead
to the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.200
After Tuilaepa, each phase of the capital sentencing process has its own
standard to determine if an aggravating factor utilized is unconstitutionally vague. If the aggravating factors utilized in the selection phase of
sentencing are the same as those utilized in the eligibility phase, then
only the eligibility phase standard of vagueness needs to be satisfied,
because the eligibility phase standard is more rigorous than the selection
phase standard.201 The eligibility phase standard requires that the
sentencing authority's discretion be channeled by clear and objective
standards that provide specific and detailed guidance. 202 If a different
set of factors is utilized in the selection phase, as in California, then the
factors utilized in the selection phase must satisfy the selection phase
vagueness standard instead of the eligibility phase standard. That
standard requires that an aggravating factor have some "common-sense
core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of understanding. "203 Therefore, through its decision in Tuilaepa, the Supreme
Court implies that the function an aggravating factor is constitutionally
mandated to perform, as well as the amount of precision the Constitution
requires in defining it, depends upon the phase of the capital sentencing
process in which the aggravating factor is utilized.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has traced the evolution of the requirements placed
upon capital punishment statutes and the manner in which those
requirements permit the death penalty to be a constitutional form of
punishment. Central to all of the constitutional capital punishment
statutes has been the aggravating factor, or something the Supreme Court
has construed to be its equivalent. Over the past two decades, the Court
has devoted an immeasurable amount of time to its efforts to clarify the
requirements the Constitution places upon the use of aggravating factors,

199. See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
202. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
203. Tui/aepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2636 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279
(1976) (White, J., concurring)).
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as well as how aggravating factors permit the death penalty to be
imposed in a constitutional manner.
After the "'76 Cases," the simple inclusion of aggravating factors in
a capital punishment statute virtually ensured its constitutional validity.
In those cases, the Court endorsed aggravating factors as the preferred
means to prevent the constitutional deficiencies addressed in Furman v.
Georgia. In Godfrey v. Georgia the Court ruled that the simple
inclusion of aggravating factors was no longer sufficient. The Court
found that if the constitutional deficiencies addressed in Furman· were
to be adequately addressed, the aggravating factors had to be defined
with a certain amount of precision. Next, in Zant v. Stephens, the Court
ruled that defining aggravating factors in a certain manner was no longer
sufficient. The Court found that aggravating factors must also perform
a certain function if all of the constitutional concerns regarding the death
penalty were to be satisfied. Now, in the recent decision of Tuilaepa v.
California, the Court rules that what is needed to satisfy these two
requirements depends upon the phase of capital sentencing in which the
aggravating factors are utilized.
Thus, the Supreme Court's cases on capital punishment make two
things clear. First, the appropriate use of aggravating factors will
guarantee that a capital punishment statute is constitutional. Second,
what constitutes the appropriate use of aggravating factors is an evolving
concept allowing the imposition of the death penalty to comport with the
contemporary societal values used to determine the protection of the
Eighth Amendment.
DAVID HESSELTINE
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